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Abstract 
This paper applies equilibrium analysis in micro-economics to analyze a stable structure in a 
model of human society. The structure is observed in the study of the distribution of information. 
It forms a three-layered hierarchy. These layers are called brains, gatekeepers and end users. 
The three-layer structure is widely observed in a variety of research fields. For example, in 
computer networks, core gateways correspond to brains, stub gateways behave like gatekeepers, 
and local networks are end users. The three-layer model is considered to be an essential extension 
of the popular “client-server” concept in computer science. 
This paper calculates the supply and demand curves in micro-economics to show how the 
equilibrium is established. The law of diminishing utility is utilized to represent the distribution 
of information or knowledge. The calculations are straightforward if the dependence of the end 
users on the other layers is taken into account. The results can explain many properties of the 
three-layer model. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the structure of information distribution in human society. The 
structure cannot be disregarded when we draw the plan of computer networks. 
There are several projects which were reported to have failed because electronic 
technology is not adapted to human society. Imai claims that it is important to consider 
the way of information delivery by human being before some electronic network is 
installed [ 51. A book on personal computer communications points out that we should 
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Fig. I. A three-layer structure in the distribution of information 
take care of the relationship between electronic society and the real world [ 151. Kimura 
introduces the network of the Matsushita School of Policy and Economics [ 71, He puts 
stress on the idea that one should take a closer look at the existing human relationship 
before introducing new PC-based networks for them. 
All the examples show that it is meaningless to introduce an electronic device for 
networks unless a human relationship is already established among the users of the 
network. 
One of the authors of this paper has investigated the information distribution among 
some 180 research scientists at NTT Laboratories [ 1 I, 181. The distribution of infor- 
mation is measured through question-asking behavior about some specific topic (e.g. 
questions on computer networks). One of the significant observations shows a three- 
layered structure in human society. It is similar to the distribution of goods between 
manufacturers, wholesale distributors and retail stores. Fig. 1 shows the three-layer 
structure in [ 111. The top-level layer “brains” accept many questions. The middle layer 
“gatekeepers” forwards questions to the right person in the brain layer. The remainder 
of the structure, “end users”, raises questions more often than they answer questions. 
The structure has several interesting properties. 
( I) Each member in the society is clearly divided into three layers based on the 
number of questions asked which indicates information flow from one to the 
other. 
(2) A brain has his/her specific field of knowledge. A gatekeeper does not have any 
specific area of knowledge. He/she knows general information. 
(3) Each brain recognizes who are the other brains. A gatekeeper does not know 
who are the other gatekeepers. A gatekeeper is somewhat isolated from other 
gatekeepers. 
This paper deals with the observation by Nojima and tries to generalize it by finding 
the rationales behind the observation [ 111. We hope that similar structures will be found 
in other areas of human activity. 
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To analyze the structure, we put an assumption on the distribution of information 
or knowledge. Based on this assumption, we will show that the three-layered model 
is reasonable from the view point of micro-economics or price theory. The result can 
explain the distribution structure in general as well as our earlier observation in [ 111. 
2. Utility and cost functions 
Our method of analysis is based on the economic principle of “equilibrium of demand 
and supply” [ 6,191. The demand curve is represented by utility functions, and the 
supply curve is represented by cost functions. To determine the functions (the shape 
of the curves), we should investigate the properties of the goods to be analyzed The 
goods here are “information”. 
We should call the analysis in this paper “economics of knowledge” because the term 
“economics of information” is already used in the literature, meaning the analysis of 
uncertain information, such as the lottery or the market for used automobiles [ 8,14,17]. 
2.1. Utility function of knowledge 
We will consider the utility function first. The shape of the utility curve (function) 
depends on the kind of knowledge. For example, Nojima investigates knowledge on 
computer networks [ 111. This paper treats utility functions of knowledge in general. 
Fig. 2 shows the curve of a typical utility function. It decreases to the right which 
illustrates the law of diminishing marginal utility [ 6,191. The marginal utility means 
the amount of increased utility when the amount of goods increases by one unit, that 
is, the amount of increase in horizontal axis when the amount of goods moves right in 
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Fig. 3. Zipf’s law. 
one unit along the horizontal axis. We assume that the utility function shows the same 
diminishing property. 
We found that Zipf’s law can be used to represent the utility function of knowledge. 
Zipf’s law was originally introduced to explain the statistics of the occurrence of words 
in English texts. Fig. 3 shows Zipf’s law. It claims that the most frequently used word 
is “the” which covers 10% of all the English words. The second word in the ranking is 
“of” which shows 5%, the third “and” is 3.33%, the fourth “to” occupies 2.5%, and so 
on. The law represents the percentage p(r) by a formula. 
y(r) = y, where r stands for the rank in the occurrence, 
0.1 means 10%. 
Zipf’s law is applied to several areas other than the statistics of English word oc- 
currence. For example, Pierce explains that the statistics of population of cities in one 
country is well described by Zipf’s law [ 161. Okuno made an interesting report on the 
statistics of command usage of the EMACS editor, where Zipf’s law explains that the 
most frequently used command covers 10% of the total command usage and the sec- 
ond one is 5% etc. [ 12,131. Precisely speaking, Zipf’s law is a kind of approximation 
formula and the total sum of the distribution is more than 100% according to the law. 
When an English text consists of 1000 words, the number of occurrences is calculated 
as the upper curve in Fig. 4. If a text has 500 words, the calculation ends up with the 
middle curve. The curve in Fig. 4 means that you can understand 100 out of 1000 words 
if you only know the word “the”. You can also understand 150 out of 1000 words if 
you know both of “the” and “of”. 
We assume that it is useful to know English words; that is, we assume that knowledge 
of English words has some utility. To determine the utility function of the knowledge, 
we should select the unit measure of utility. If we adopt the utility of one English word 
as the unit of utility, the utility function can be represented by the curve of Zipf’s law. 
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The utility function derived here is the marginal utility. That is, the utility of the 
single word “the” is 100 units when we read a lOOO-word English text. The utility of 
the word “of’ is 50 units, and “and” is 33.3 units. If one knows “the” and “of”, one 
has 150 units. If one knows “the”, “of’ and “to”, one has 183.3 units. If one knows the 
words up to rank r, ones utility is the sum of the utilities of each word from rank 1 to 
rank Y. 
Zipf’s law is a typical diminishing marginal utility function. Our analysis in this paper 
can be applied to any other utility curves which shows the diminishing property. 
2.2. fkfarginal cost function 
The second step of our analysis is to determine the cost function. It is not clear 
how human beings memorize knowledge such as English words. We will derive the 
approximate cost function based on the cost of memory in computers. There are sev- 
eral methods of memorizing English words in computers. For example, one can use a 
directory structure. Assume that the initial cost for providing the first directory structure 
is al, and the cost for each word is b. When the first directory is full, then the second 
directory should be provided at the cost of up The cost function takes the form of 
Fig. 5. One can also use a hash table technique to memorize English words. The size 
of hash tables varies according to the number of words in it. Assume that the cost for 
making a new hash table is al, a2, as, . . . and the cost for a single word entry is b. The 
cost function again takes the form of Fig. 5. 
We can easily derive the marginal cost function from Fig. 5. The marginal cost means 
the increased cost to memorize a new single word. Fig. 6 is the marginal cost function 
derived from Fig. 5. It is almost constant b everywhere. In the literature of economics, 
it is usually assumed that a cost function is 2-times differentiable. If we adopt such an 
assumption, the marginal curve is approximated by a constant b. 
The marginal cost and the marginal utility has a cross point 0 shown in Fig. 7. 
This is the equilibrium point where supply and demand meet. Precisely speaking, some 
knowledge does not have an equilibrium point at all. If marginal cost b is too high 
to meet with the utility curve, there is no cross point. The situation occurs when the 
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cost of memory is too high. It is not economically reasonable to have such expensive 
knowledge. We will exclude such cases of too expensive knowledge. Since we assume 
that the curve is diminishing, we have a cross point to the right of the graph no matter 
how low the marginal cost b is. However, if the marginal cost b is 0, there is no cross 
point. We will exclude the case of zero cost memory. After all, we will assume that 
there is a cross point which represents an equilibrium of utility and cost. 
If all members in a society behave uniformly, the above analysis for a single person 
can be aggregated to have a social utility and a social cost. They are simply the sum 
of the utility and the sum of the cost of a single person [6]. The equilibrium point 
for a uniform society is similar to Fig. 7. However, the social equilibrium point for a 
two-layered structure is different from the cross point for a single person derived here. 
We will discuss this in the next section. 
3. Two-layered structure 
The final goal of this paper is to explain the three-layered structure. Let us first 
analyze the two-layered structure. 
The equilibrium point in the last section assumes that all English words should 
be memorized by oneself. However, it is not necessary to personally memorize all 
knowledge. Nojima discusses how people help each other [ 11 I. He observed a kind 
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of division of labor among people. A member in a society can consult dictionaries or 
ask friends for unknown words. We assume a closed society; that is, one asks about 
unknown words to other members within the society. They can help each other. We also 
exclude the usage of dictionaries because our example knowledge is not English words, 
but knowledge about computer networks. 
The cost for asking other members should be analyzed. It is totally different from 
memory cost analyzed in the previous section. One can use a word many times if one 
has the word in memory. On the contrary, one should pay some cost every time one 
raises a question. The cost includes communication cost, some cost which compensates 
for the time spent for asking etc. Both end users and brains have to pay the cost of 
communications. We follow the analysis by Hayashi [4] and categorize the cost as 
follows. 
(4 
(b) 
Cc) 
Fixed cost: An end user can ask a question to a brain if he belongs to a community 
(a “club” in [ 51). There are costs for maintaining the community and the 
communications facilities. These costs do not depend on the amount of knowledge 
and the number of questions. They are called fixed cost. 
Variable cost I: The cost which depends on the amount of knowledge, but does 
not depend on the number of questions. It covers the cost for the brain who is 
prepared for questions. 
Variable cost II: The cost which depends on the number of questions. It covers 
such costs as communications cost, time spent in the communications between 
end users and brains. 
In the literature of economics, the equilibrium analysis is called “long run” if the cost 
(a) is taken into account. The analysis is called “short run” if only the costs (b) and 
(c) are considered. We take a short run analysis because the observation by Nojima 
was for a short period of time [ 111. 
This paper does not consider the effect of learning. In fact, an end user may learn 
and memorize the knowledge if he/she asks the same question again. Learning is an 
interesting research topic in a long run equilibrium. 
While this paper disregards the effect of learning for end users, we will consider the 
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effect of learning for the brains. Actually, there are many end users in a community, 
so that a brain accepts the same question many times in a short period of time. The 
response time for a brain will be shorter after repeating the same answer many times. 
Such an effect is taken into account. 
As well as learning, an end user may forget knowledge which was in his/her mem- 
ory. This paper excludes the analysis of forgetting because it is based on a short run 
equilibrium. 
The variable cost I is similar to the cost of memory. A brain should memorize some 
knowledge and provide for the questions from end users. The cost is slightly higher than 
the simple memory cost. It is, however, not necessary to figure out the precise formula 
for the variable cost I. We simply assume that a unit cost for knowledge is slightly 
higher than memory cost. 
The variable cost II is apparently proportional to the number of questions. However, 
the brain would learn how to answer the frequently asked questions. The learning curve 
is well known in cognitive science [ 1, IO]. It is claimed that the learning curve takes 
the form of a straight line in a log-log axis system. The result comes from the analysis 
of twelve learning examples in a variety of areas. The slopes of the line (parameters) 
are different among areas. The areas range from a simple task to an intelligent cognitive 
task. The line is formulated as follows. In [ IO], the line is called log-log linear learning 
law. or power law of practice. 
log(T) = log(B) - culog(N). 
That is. 
T = BN-” 
where T represents time spent for a task, N is the number of trials, B is the time 
spent for the first trial, and LY is a constant. If the formula is applied to our brain in 
answering questions, the response time for frequent questions will decrease. As a result, 
the variable cost II is lower than the cost curve in proportion to the number of questions. 
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The rest of the analysis does not assume any rigorous formula. The total cost of 
question-answering is the sum of the variable cost I and the variable cost II. The total 
cost may be as high as (i) and (ii) in Fig. 9, or middle as (iii), or low as (iv). 
If the question-answering cost is as high as (i) and (ii), it is expensive for an end 
user to ask questions to a brain. It is economical to memorize knowledge by oneself. 
On the other hand, if the question-answering cost is as low as (iv), it is economical not 
to memorize knowledge by oneself. It is reasonable to depend on others and always ask 
questions. 
The real world shows that an end user has some knowledge in his/her memory 
and asks some questions to a brain [ 111. Then, the most economical behavior is to 
memorize frequently used knowledge by oneself and ask questions on less frequently 
used knowledge. 
The behavior of question-answering means a division of labor in a society. The society 
can obtain a high efficiency because its members can enjoy much knowledge at low cost. 
The roles of end users and brains are clear. They are easily distinguished by counting 
the number of questions to ask or accept. The first property I in the observation by 
Nojima shows that the separation can be observed [ 111. 
We have assumed there is only one brain in some specific area of knowledge. If there 
are two brains in the same area, then the variable cost I is doubled. The total cost of a 
society increases. A similar calculation is applicable to n brains. As a result, the number 
of brains in some specific area should be small (say only one) to minimize the total 
cost of a society. 
We need multiple brains if the area of knowledge is too wide to be covered by a 
single brain. In the real world, there may be several brains as explained in the second 
property II in the introduction. In [ 111, the number of brains is five in a society of 
some 180 people. 
124 S Gom. H. Nojimtr/Arti~ciul Intelligence 75 (I 995) I IS-130 
(a) A two-layer structure 
(b) A three-layer structure 
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4. Transition to three-layered structure and the role of gatekeepers 
We have shown that a two-layer structure is justified by economical equilibrium 
analysis. The analysis is applied to a relatively small society. If the number of members 
in a society is large, the total cost of question-answering increases. As a result, the 
three-layered structure is justified by the equilibrium analysis. See Fig. 10. 
The reason why the total cost increases in a large society is due to the overflow at the 
brains. The phenomenon is well described by queuing theory. However, the traditional 
queuing theory only deals with stable solutions [9,21] and does not pay attention to 
overflow phenomena. 
A simple explanation of overflow is illustrated in Figs. 11 and 12. Fig. I I is a Gantt 
chart showing the arrival of questions (upper arrows) and the service time (horizontal 
thick line interval) for answering. The arrival and the service time is well balanced. 
According to the terminology in queuing theory, h indicates the number of question for 
a unit time (A is the density of arrival). p shows the number of possible answers in a 
unit time (service speed). The time interval between two question arrivals is l/A. The 
service time is 1 /p. Fig. I 1 shows a Gantt chart when A = ,U (hence l/A = 1 /p). 
Fig. 12 shows four examples where some perturbation occurs. In Fig. 12 (a), the 
second question arrives with a small delay of (Y. Then, the brain is idle for LY. If the 
rest of the questions arrive without any delay, all the question should wait for cy to be 
answered. If the series of question-answering continues for ever, the total sum of waiting 
time is infinite. This example in Fig. 12(a) shows how a small delay in arriving has a 
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Fig. 12. Four variations of the Gantt chart. 
great effect to the total waiting time. 
In Fig. 12(b), the second question arrives earlier in p. The second question should 
wait for p and does not have any effect to the total waiting time. 
In Fig. 12(c) , the brain takes a longer service time (+a). The total waiting time is 
infinite as in Fig. 12(a). In Fig. 12(d), the brain finishes the job earlier in p. The brain 
is idle for the period of /? and does not have any effect on the total waiting time. 
In summary, if a local perturbation occurs, some perturbations have a big effect on 
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the total waiting time, and the others do not have any effect at all. 
In the real world, neither A nor ,U is a constant. They follow some distribution 
function. A typical distribution of A is the Poisson distribution which approximates the 
arrival of clients at a hospital, or the number of telephone calls in a unit time. A typical 
distribution of p is an exponential distribution which approximates real services. 
If typical distributions are assumed for A and ,u, the length of a waiting queue is 
represented by the formula p/( 1 ~ p), where p is the density of traffic defined as 
the ratio of p = A/,X The mean of the Poisson distribution is A and the mean of the 
exponential distribution is /_L. When p approaches 1, the length of the waiting queue 
approaches infinity as shown in Fig. 13. 
If A and p are constants, p = 1 (i.e. A = ,u) gives the most efficient question- 
answering. However, they are not constants and p = 1 results in an infinite waiting 
queue. Even if p < 1, the length of a waiting queue becomes very long when p 
approaches 1. The long waiting queue means increasing variable cost II. When the 
variable cost II becomes large, the equilibrium analysis shows that the graph looks 
like (i) in Fig. 9. The large variable cost II breaks the equilibrium of the two-layered 
structure. 
Instead of giving up the two-layered structure, a new stable model is found in the real 
world. That is the three-layered structure in [ 111. The significant idea in a three-layered 
structure is a gatekeeper who can answer questions in place of brains. The knowledge of 
a gatekeeper is a copy of the knowledge of brains. Fig. 14 illustrates that the combination 
of brains and gatekeepers plays the role of a brain in two-layered model. Brains and 
gatekeepers divide the labor of answering to questions. The two layers of brains and 
gatekeepers are just like the earlier two-layered structure. 
The origin of the information is kept by brains. Gatekeepers can reduce the number 
of questions directly addressed to brains so that the variable cost II decreases. This 
mechanism prevents the overflow at brains. 
Since gatekeepers have more knowledge than end users, the social cost increases by 
introducing the gatekeepers. On the other hand, gatekeepers can reduce the variable cost 
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II and decrease the total cost in a society. The number of gatekeepers can be determined 
based on the trade-off between the increasing knowledge cost and the decreasing variable 
cost II. According to Nojima, our example community has five gatekeepers out of some 
180 people [ 111. 
It is also possible to have a four-layered structure when the three-layered structure is 
not stable. A similar discussion provides the transition from four layers to five layers and 
so on. In general, some overflow justifies the transition from n-layer to (n + 1)-layer. 
The example in [ 111 shows an instance where a three-layer structure is stable. 
Gatekeepers should answer frequently asked questions (usually abbreviated as FAQs) 
by themselves. If they pass most questions to brains, there might be some overflow 
and the structure is unstable. The role of gatekeepers is information processing, or 
discriminating FAQs and rare important questions which should be sent to brains. 
Modern computer communications can reduce the cost of transaction between brains 
and end users. If the variable cost II decreases, a two-layered structure can be stable for 
a wider range of parameters. It is possible to reduce the number of layers by introducing 
a new communication medium, because the number depends on the variable cost II. 
The three-layered structure is important, because it can explain many working models 
in the world. In earlier days, some economists predicted that “wholesale distributors 
should be simplified and there is no real need for them”. The prediction was false [ 51. 
The three-layered structure in real goods distribution is stable, and it is impossible to 
replace it by a two-layered structure. Gatekeepers in this paper play the same role as 
the wholesale goods distributor. We believe that gatekeepers perform some essential 
information processing. This paper analyzed gatekeepers using equilibrium analysis in 
micro economics. Since our analysis is based on the balance between utility and cost, 
the important aspect of information processing is not covered here. We hope it will be 
discussed in the near future. 
5. Examples of three-layered structures 
There are many examples of three-layered structures. In the area of education, the 
teacher-student model is two-layered and applicable to small classes. In a large class, a 
student cannot ask questions directly to the teacher. He/she asks questions to a teaching 
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Table I 
Examples of a three-layered model 
Examples education computer client 
network server 
bibliography distribution 
brain 
gatekeeper 
end USCI 
teacher core server original factory 
gateway paper 
teaching stub request textbook wholesale 
assistant gateway manager distributor 
student LAN client paper retailer 
assistant who is an example of a gatekeeper. 
In computer networks, the Internet shows a three-layered structure. There are “core” 
gateways in the center of the networks, to which “stub” gateways are connected. Stub 
gateways are gatekeepers. The end users in computer networks are LANs (local area 
networks) [ 21. This three-layered structure is a natural extension of the popular client- 
server mode1 in distributed computing. The client-server model takes the form of a 
two-layered structure and there is a proposal to add request managers as the middle 
layer. The request managers, or brokers, are gatekeepers. The request managers are 
called special databases in [ 201. 
An interesting example is found in the relationship of references in technical papers 
[ 31. An original paper is a brain. The end users are regular papers. The well-referenced 
papers or textbooks are gatekeepers. We sometimes realize that it is not necessary to 
refer to an original paper. This paper is not an exception. We made references to many 
textbooks which are listed in the bibliography. 
The three-layered structure is apparently similar to the distribution of goods in real- 
world economy. However, knowledge has some specific properties. For example, it 
is easy to make copies of knowledge. The roles of gatekeepers are different in real 
goods and in knowledge. If the information-processing aspect is considered, there are 
some properties in common. The wholesale distributors of real goods accept ordering 
information from retail stores (end users) and compile them in order to prevent overflow 
at the manufacturers. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper applies equilibrium analysis in micro economics to information distribution 
in human society to generalize the result of Nojima [ 111. The three-layered structure is 
shown to be stable. 
The amount of knowledge concentrated at the brains is fairly large compared to that of 
end users. Therefore, it is difficult to bring up the successor of a brain among end users. 
Furthermore, It is considered dangerous to have only one brain even if it is economical 
to reduce the number of brains. Actually, some computer networks cannot be operated 
well after they lose a good brain. This paper only shows basic results and does not 
analyze risks which may occur when a brain is unavailable by some reason. 
The theory of overflow is useful. The role of gatekeepers is to prevent overflow at 
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a brain. A brain is extremely busy even if gatekeepers help. This paper assumes that 
a gatekeeper is a human being. Actually, this is not necessarily so. The example of 
paper reference shows that a good textbook can play the role of a gatekeeper. Good 
textbooks and manuals are helpful from the standpoint of this paper. Good dictionaries 
are important to help people learn foreign languages. 
This paper is just a small step towards a study of the distribution mechanisms in 
human society. Some important aspects, like learning, are not discussed here. 
The analysis of gatekeepers has much room for improvement. The knowledge of 
gatekeepers is not just a copy of the knowledge of brains. The gatekeeper has a key role 
in human society. 
The analysis in this paper is static. The authors have a plan to analyze the generation 
process of the structure. 
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